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A recent article in a popular magazine is headed in large red
type: "WHo's RGHT -THE LAwYER OR ThE DocToR?"' The article
itself is responsibly written and does not amount to a diatribe
against law and lawyers by scientists or the reverse attack on
scientists by lawyers or judges that so often appears. It does, how-
ever, bring to public focus a feeling that there exists a basic an-
tagonism in forensic psychiatry and psychology.
Actually, much professional literature does reflect rather
violent feelings back and forth among men trained to think in
radically different patterns.2 Many refuse to consider the prob-
ability that there has been too much "right or wrong" talk in this
area already. When men incompletely understand each other, it
is often found that tempers flare. To counteract this trend, the
"law-science movement ' 3 has sprung forth with the idea that what
is needed is an affirmative integration of the efforts of persons
trained in the law and of those trained in science. It is this spirit
which has prompted this special symposium and others like it.
The fundamental tenet of the law-science approach can be
simply stated: In an age of science, those human principles de-
signed to regulate human conduct ("rules of law") should be firm-
ly grounded upon insights developed by the various sciences.
To achieve this goal, there must be a fundamental semantic
cooperation of lawyer and scientist. "Communication barriers"
have been erected between professional men as their individual
specialties have grown. As each area of investigation has prog-
ressed, shorthand expressions ("technical jargon") have appeared.
Communication is thereby facilitated among members of the
***Director, Law-Medicine, University of Kansas City School of Law.
Background student research has been provided by Mr. Warren Donaldson
of the forensic neurology and psychiatry class, and by Mrs. Barbara Logan
who is studying in the Department of Psychology.
1 Deutsch, Woman's Home Companion, June 1952, p. 44. Similar titles have
recently appeared in the technical literature. For example, see Shindell,
Medicine vs. Law: A Proposal for Settlement, 151 J.AMA. 1078 (1953).
2 The main currents of this "conflict talk" are set out by Hall, Mental
Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 COL. L. REv. 677 (1945), substantially
reprinted as Chapter 14 of GEmmAL PRmcIiSs or CRIMNAL LAW 477 (1947).
3 Smith, The Philosophical and Practical Basis for the Synthesis of Law
and Science, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 625 (1953); Editorial, The Tulane University Law-
Science Program, 25 TuLANE L. REv. 214 (1951); Brosman, Two Recent Program
Additions, 24 TULANE L. REv. 108 (1949).
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specialist group, but a verbal "iron curtain" is drawn as far as the
specialist in another discipline is concerned.4
It has been the lawyer's task traditionally to serve the func-
tion of "humanist" as regards technical information. In a case
where some scientific fact or theory is in issue, the advocate has
been faced with a problem of digesting available technical knowl-
edge and then translating it into readily understood terms for
benefit of a tribunal lacking in specialized education or knowledge.
Because of this history, scientists rightly expect lawyers to lead
the way in forging law-science linkages. It will be our purpose
here to call attention to several landmark efforts in this evolu-
tion in what has been called "psychological law."5
L CONTRAcTS AND WILS
In civil cases the lawyer often encounters problems of mental
illness in contract cases and will contests. Other instances in which
such problems arise in a similar vein include guardianship proceed-
ings, litigation involving family problems, and tort actions against
the mentally ill. We will confine ourselves to contracts and wills
in this discussion 6
Perhaps the most illuminating study in this area is that fash-
ioned by Green on mental incompetency.7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Reaffirming
4 This professional isolationism has been well recognized by forward-looking
psychiatrists. "Law and medicine, because they have each been pursuing
their own ends independently, have come to talk, as it were, different lan-
guages. The aims of both professions are however, I believe, the same, so
far at least as they affect the common weal, but they have thus far been
unable to get together largely because they do not understand each other.
Each profession has its background and traditions and habits of thought
radically different from the other and finally each in his turn comes to talk
its own language, which members of the other profession do not understand.
There is a sore need for overcoming this difficulty of understanding, but so
long as doctor and lawyer meet only as witness and cross-examiner there
is little hope. We must get together and work together, and it is on the
basis of the recognition of a common purpose that an understanding will
come." White, The Need for Cooperation Between the Legal Profession and
the Psychiatrist in Dealing with the Crime Problem, 52 A.BA. RzP. 497, 498
(1927).
SWharton speaks of the specialty of psychological law in his treatise on
ME=SAL UNSOUNDNESS, EMBRACING A GENERAL ViEw or PsYcHLowaicAL LAw
(Published as Book 1, WHAnTON Am S=Xsss MEDICAL JURISPRUDENcE [3d ed.
1873]).
6A more all-inclusive presentation is that of Guttmacher and Weihofen,
Mental Incompetency, 36 Mnum. L. Pxv. 179 (1952), which forms the stubstance
of Chapter 14 of their treatise, PSYCHIATRY AND THE Lw 323 (1952).
7 Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38
MicI. L. Pav. 1189 (1940).
8 ............ , Judicial Tests of Mental Competency, 6 Mo. L. RBa. 141
(1941).
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the view that the term "insanity" has come to have little useful-
ness because of its sematic abuse, he substitutes 'mental incom-
petency"- "that type or degree of mental disorder, in any par-
ticular case, which is legally significant and which produces a dif-
ferent legal result than would have flowed from the same situa-
tion had not that particular type or degree of mental disorder been
present."' 2
As I interpret Green's work, the following propositions seem
to have great force:
1. Public policy underlying this law consists of derivations
of two fundamental interests-
(a) Security
(1) "It is the policy of the law to protect the
security of transactions;
(2) "It is the policy of the law to protect the
security of acquisitions; and
(3) "It is the policy of the law to protect the
social institution of the family." 3
(b) Equality
"People are not equals in any real or substan-
tial sense, and the law has recognized this
truth. In realizing the glaring discrepancy be-
tween the real and the ideal, the law, has
sought to remedy the situation by producing
equality where inequality had heretofore ex-
isted. It has developed a policy of equaliza-
tion, which it has put into effect by extending
a measure of protection to those classes of
persons who are not, in any real sense, the
equals of their contemporaries in the society
in which they live."' 4
This protective policy assumes three forms:
(1) "Protection of the public or of society
at large from the acts of the mental incom-
petent.
(2) "Protection of the incompetent from so-
ciety, because of the unequal position which
he occupies toward his fellow men.
(3). "Protection, not of society, nor of the in-
competent himself, but of the family or de-
pendents of the incompetent."' Is
9 ............. Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency, -A
Study in Related Concepts, 43 COL. L. RPv. 176 (1943).
10 ............ , The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agree-
ments and Wills, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 554 (1943).
11 ............ , Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L. J. 271 (1944).
12 Green,supra, note 7, at 1191-92.
13 Id. at 1207.
14 Id. at 1207-08.
Is Id. at 1213.
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2. In establishing judicial tests for mental incompetency,
i. e., drawing a line of demarcation between the "nor-
mal" and the "mentally incompetent," a subjective
standard is ostensibly applied whereas in reality an ob-
jective standard is used. Though the traditional "un-
derstanding test '1 6 is stated as the rule of law, judges,
of necessity, cannot probe the inner reaches of the mind.
Rather, "they base their judgments, just as the psy-
chiatrists do, upon the behavior of the person investi-
gated, only they do not admit they are doing it. Hav-
ing examined (from the evidence produced at trial) the
behavior of the individual, insofar as that behavior was
revealed to the court, the judge (or jury) then passes
upon the question as to whether or not that behavior
conformed to the standard set by the law. Since the
standard is phrased in terms of mind, and not in terms
of behavior, the fact finder draws the necessary infer-
ence of the state of the individual's mind from his ob-
served behavior. In other words, he must translate his
actual finding into the language of the standard which
has been set up. But the fact remains that what is ac-
tually happening is that judges, no less than psychi-
atrists, are employing an essentially behavioristic tech-
nique. The difference lies in the fact that the judges
do not do it deliberately, but still conduct their inquiry
as if they were not examining behavior, but instead
were scrutinizing mind."' 7
3. Since the law is necessarily concerned with separating
somewhat arbitrarily those persons who are "normal"
and those who do not meet the test of "mental com-
petency," cases which fall close to the line often present
difficulties. In order to compensate for lack of a "slid-
ing scale of legal effects," the law is able to mitigate
possible harsh results in these borderline cases by inte-
grating concepts of fraud and undue influence with
those of mental incompetency.
4. In establishing the operative effect of a finding of mental
incapacity on wills or contracts (i. e., are they "void"
or "voidable"), courts must weigh two conflicting pub-
lic policies. "One policy is to protect the incompetent or
his dependents. The other is to uphold the security of
transactions. These policies are at war with each other.
If full recognition is given to the former the instrument
will be held utterly void. If full recognition is given
to the latter the instrument will be held valid. How-
ever, the modern tendency is to adopt neither of these
extreme positions but rather to effect some sort of com-
promise between these conflicting policies. The com-
promise is effected under the guise of calling the instru-
ment 'voidable,' but in measuring the legal consequence
flowing from this concept the courts try to work out a
1 6 In re Humphrey, 236 N.C. 141, 71 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1952).
17 Green, supra note 8, at 161. See also Malan, The Behavieuristic Basis
of the Science of Law, 8 A.B.J. 737 (1922), 9 A.B.AJ. 43 (1923).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
result which will balance the competing equities in the
concrete case."'i s
5. Evidentiary facts used to establish the probandum of
mental incompetency can be conveniently classed in
four groups:
(a) "Symptomatic conduct of the alleged incom-
petent;
(b) "Opinion testimony of incompetency;
(c) "Organic condition and habits of the alleged
incompetent;
(d) "Moral aspects of the transaction and its con-
sequences." 19
Green submits that probative value increases as one goes down
the list. Indeed, he suggests that a sub-category of (d) is often con-
trolling. This consideration is "whether or not the transaction con-
forms to the normal pattern of similar transactions. '20 The touch-
stone of this entire thread of the law as concerns the science of
proof,21 is forcefully distilled by Green with an assist from Llew-
ellyn:
"It is submitted that in determining the issue of mental
incompetency, more frequently than otherwise, courts
are passing upon the abnormality of the transaction
rather than on the ability of the alleged incompetent
to understand the transaction. To rephrase this thought
in terms of legal doctrine, we might say that since, both
in unconscious desire and in articulate effort, the court
is seeking evidence on whether mental incompetency
has affected the particular transaction, the dominant
factor in the evidence is whether the court sees the
particular transaction in its result as that which a rea-
sonably competent man might have made."22
The reader is, of course, referred to Green's masterful analysis
of the cases in this area which found the general propositions set
out. It has been the pitfall of many lawyers, and more particularly
of scientists, to be unable or unwilling to look beyond the bare
statements of rules of law for their functional underpinnings. When
the more pervasive principles are examined, however, I feel that
increased understanding is mutually promoted between scientists
and lawyers. It amounts to a process not unlike depth-analysis of
the psychiatrist, the meticulous dissection of the anatomist, or the
astute probing for cause and effect of the medical clinician.
II. HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL
Current attention as regards hospitalization is largely centered
18 Green, supra note 10, at 589.
19 Green, supra note 11, at 275.
20 Id. at 298-99.
21 See infra note 38.
22 Green, supra note 11 at 307-07.
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on the Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally 111.23
Since hospitalization of the mentally ill is now predominately with-
in the scope of state medicine, it was entirely proper that an agency
of the federal government concern itself with drafting this im-
portant model legislation. It can be hoped that within a relatively
short span of years the several states will see fit to consider and
adopt the Act in its essential features.
Again, we see the older term "insanity" discarded in favor
of more useful terminology. By Section 1, (a), a mentally ill in-
dividual is defined as "an individual having a psychiatric or other
disease which substantially impairs his mental health."24 Here, we
are more properly dealing with a clinical diagnosis of psychiatric
illness than we were when considering mental incompetency. Goals
of the law are different in the two situations. The rationale of
hospitalization has to do with treatment and rehabilitation. With
mental incompetency, we were more concerned with the ability of
the individual to carry on certain transactions. There is a valid
reason, therefore, for establishing clinical criteria of mental illness
when hospitalization is at issue, though we feel justified in looking
to a standard of "fairness or unfairness of the individual transac-
tion" in litigation involving mental incompetency.
Under provisions for voluntary hospitalization, treatability ap-
pears as the primary concern. Any person who is mentally ill un-
der the definition cited, or who has symptoms of mental illness,
comes within the purview of this part of the Draft Act. Of course,
effective implementation of such provisions in hospitalization laws
is beyond present contemplation due to the shortage of facilities
and trained personnel -a reflection of traditional public apathy
toward the mentally ill.
With involuntary hospitalization, the criteria for admission in-
volve not only the fact of mental illness, but also additional social
factors. Under the standard nonjudicial procedure with certifica-
tion by two designated examiners, it is required "that they have ex-
amined the individual and that they are of the opinion that
(A) he is mentally ill, and
(B) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, or
(C) is in need of treatment in a mental hospital, and be-
cause of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or ca-
pacity to make responsible application therefor. '25
It becomes apparent, then, that there is no necessary correla-
tion between "mental incompetency" and "mental illness which is
23 
PuBLIc HEALTH SERVICE PUBLICAION No. 51, A DRAF AcT GOVERNInG
HOSPTALIZATION OF T3E MENTAILY ILL (1952). The text of the Act, devoid
of commentary, is reprinted in DAVIDSON, FoREsIc PSYCHIATRY 377 (1952).
24 DRAFT AcT, supra note 23, at 4.
2sId. at 6.
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treatable or which may endanger the physical safety of the patient
or others." In the past, these terms have too often been confused
as a result of using the term "insanity." Today we find persons who
require hospitalization but who are not mentally incompetent. So
also, there are mentally incompetent individuals who could not
benefit from hospitalization and who are not patently dangerous
to others. Justice is certainly not fostered by lumping all of these
people together under the label, "insane."
A scope note prefacing the Draft Act indicates that the defini-
tion of mentally ill person excludes the mentally defective, but is
intended to "include persons who are psychopaths, chronic alcohol-
ics, or members of other special groups... to the extent that the
individual meets the criteria set forth in the definition." 26 This
brings us to a consideration of one of the greatest enigmas con-
fronting law and medicine today- what to do about the so-called
"psychopath" or "neurotic character" -the person who is not "out
of touch with reality" but whose disorder lies in the fact that he
suffers from "a form of neurotic reaction which has as its principal
symptom a deviation of behavior which is antisocial and undesir-
able by present day moral and legal standards."27 In short, his
disturbance in personal adjustment is "taken out on his environ-
ment" rather than internalized as is the case with other neurotics.
Traditionally, the state mental hospitals have been primarily
devoted to the care of psychotic individuals. Often, when "psy-
chopaths" were admitted upon request of law enforcement officers
or others because of violent behavior, these people caused such dis-
turbances in the hospital that administrators were wont to release
them as soon as possible. Since many psychiatrists adhered to a
"gentlemen's agreement" type of approach to "sanity hearings,"
they were willing to equate "insanity" with "psychosis," and since
the "psychopath" was not technically psychotic, they opined that
he was not "insane" and so was eligible for release despite his po-
tential for destruction.
Since the newer legislation contemplated under the model
Draft Act makes provision for hospitalizing "psychopaths," it will
be up to the public to demand facilities for their treatment (if treat-
able) or their social isolation (if they are sources of danger to the
community).
These are only the more apparent offsprings of the clarification
in definition of mental illness. Others are certain to follow if the
legislation is widely adopted. Our thought in stressing a revised
terminology has been to contrast "mental incompetency" with
"mental illness" (as defined in the Draft Act). Now let us turn
26 Id. at 1.
2 7 SRzcKma, EBAUGH, A EwALT, PaAcTicAL CLncAL PsYcHrTRaY 31 (7th
ed. 1951).
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to another semantic problem involving "responsibility" and "ac-
countability."
Ill. Cm=AL REsPONSmnT OR AccouNTABn=Y
The professional literature abounds in discussions of mental
states and the criminal law. My limited purpose here is to invite
attention to three crucial constellations of inquiry in this field:
1. Substitution of "accountability" for "responsibility" in
the legal test of mental disease sufficient to establish a
defense to crime;
2. Substitution of "clinical language" for "punitive terms"
in the rehabilitation of criminal offenders;
3. Basic changes in criminal law administration to uphold
the law and yet salvage human resources now being
dissipated.
The first of these hinges on a very provocative article that ap-
peared just last year.28 Instead of inquiring as to whether "the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong," the inquiry becomes, "was the de-
fendant suffering from disease of the mind and if so, was it suf-
ficient to render him unaccountable under the law for the crime
charged?" 29 As explained by the authors, "the question then be-
comes not whether his knowledge of the quality or nature of the act,
and his comprehension that he was doing wrong was affected, but
whether the total personality (i. e., the ego), was impaired by
mental disease to a degree rendering him unable to adjust to so-
ciety's rules. °0 ... The anticipated benefit in expert testimony by
the use of the concept 'accountability' is in the direction of pro-
viding an objective description and analysis of subjective phe-
nomena in persons accused of crime in conjunction with an esti-
mation of the degree of ego impairment resulting from his illness.
In estimating the impairment of the whole organism, not merely
a traditionally restricted area of mental function will be the subject
of the test, but the degree of disturbance of total personality func-
tion will be examined.... What the psychiatrist estimates is the
degree of socio-biologic impairment (illness) of the person in terms
of present day psychologic knowledge. The jury would decide to
accept or reject the psychiatrist's opinion of how accountable the
prisoner is without recourse to the 'knowledge of right or wrong'
test. The suggested test is broader and more realistic. It is not
29Bromberg and Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma; A Suggested So-
lution, 42 J. Cam. L., CRIMIOLOGY, AND PoLicE ScmwcE 729 (1952).
29The older language is quoted from M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin-
ney 200, 210; 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). The suggested test is that of
Bromberg and Cleckley, supra note 28, at 742.
30 Bromberg and Cleckley, supra note 28, at 744.
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applied to an arbitrary isolated 'moral sense' but to the functional
capacity of the actual human organism as he is encountered in
practical life and in medical study."3'
This approach to the problem of determining criminal account-
ability is certainly of the functional variety, but many people are
concerned lest we center all our attention on "insanity as a de-
fense in criminal cases." Is not the post-conviction stage worthy
of more emphasis? Since juries can be capricious and "convict the
innocent" or convict the mentally ill who are nevertheless "account-
able" in their eyes, what of these victims? What of the many con-
victs who manifest social or emotional pathology that does not en-
ter into the "defense of insanity"?
Again, in this, our second inquiry, new concepts are being ap-
plied. Recently, the Attorney General of the United States an-
nounced 2 that the Federal Youth Corrections Act 3 would be
promptly implemented. 34 Clinical terms of "treatment and rehabili-
tation" replace "punishment and retribution"! Rumblings of the
many ways in which modern dynamic psychology and psychiatry
are being brought to bear in this movement are cogently spotlighted
by a distinguished lawyer and psychoanalyst, Marcel Frym.35 When
the insights of scientists are effectively marshalled to actually treat
and rehabilitate criminal offenders -the process now underway -
we can look forward to a further step which may mitigate problems
inherent in the first two inquiries.
This third improvement, though perhaps appearing radical at
first blush, has actually been advocated for many years by per-
sons learned in the law. Wharton's analysis, published eighty years
ago, to my mind is a classic and deserves quotation:
If the views taken in the preceding sections be sound;
if in the first place, there are inherent difficulties in the
way of making insanity a ground of defense on the trial of
a man who, on this hypothesis, is psychologically incapable
of either tendering or preparing any such issue; if, in the
second place, we must recognize sanity and insanity as
pressing into each other gradually at a line that cannot be
judicially defined, each being capable of various degrees;
31 Id. at 744-45.
32 K.C. Times, May 23, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
33 64 STAT. 1085 (1950), 18 U.S.C. Ch. 402 (Supp. 1951).
34 See also Bennett, Blueprinting the New Youth Corrections Program, 15
FEDERA PRoBATioN, 3 (Sept. 1951).
3S The Criminal Intent; Outdated Concept, 31 TEXAS L. 1Ev. 260 (1953).
In addition, see Hacker and Frym, The Legal Concept of Insanity and the
Treatment of Criminal Impulses, 37 CAin. L. Rlv. 575 (1949). In earlier years,
Karl Menninger spearheaded this development. VEtm=GER, THE Hum= Mum
443-460 (3d ed. 1945); Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 52 A.B.A. REP. 486 (1927); The Psychiatrist in Relation to Crime,
51 A. B. A. REP. 751 (1926).
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if, in the third place, it be right that the present system of
confinement of insane criminals be remodeled - then it
will become necessary for those to whom the work of leg-
islation is committed to amend the law so as to require the
question of insanity to be determined by a competent tri-
bunal after a conviction of the fact of guilt. For the follow-
ing undeniable evils result from the present system:
a. A tribunal of at least but secondary competence is
charged with the determination of the most difficult and
yet most momentous question to which human observation
can be applied.
b. A subject is introduced into the question of guilt or
innocence, as to which no fixed judicial rules can be laid
down, and which really concerns only the character and the
extent of punishment.
c. We find by this process the sane convict; the ma-
lignant insane convict, who requires discipline and is in
some degree morally responsible; the innocent insane con-
vict; and the lunatic, who is in confinement but is not
charged with crime: for all of whom there is in some juris-
dictions but one common method of discipline provided,
viz., that of the penitentiary; in others, but two, that of the
penitentiary and of the ordinary lunatic asylum. The result
of this is acquittals in some cases, where there should be
convictions; convictions in other cases where there should
be acquittals, and in almost all cases an erroneous system
of punishment.
The remedy for these difficulties is one to which we
must come sooner or later, and for which the common law
has been from the beginning always striving, and yet los-
ing from almost its very grasp. It is to confine the inquiry
before the court and jury to the mere factum of the com-
mission of the offence; reserving the question of the treat-
ment to be determined by a special commission of experts,
to be appointed for the purpose of examining convicts al-
leged to be insane. The proposition to be put by the court
to the jury, under such circumstances, is not, "Was the de-
fendant capable of judging between right and wrong?" a
proposition which no jury can determine, but "Did he," as
a matter of fact, "commit the specific act charged?" For
whether he committed it as sane or insane, the result is,
if the offence in point of law is indictable, that the safety
of society requires that he should be placed in seclusion
for such a period as will promote the joint ends of personal
reformation and the preservation of the well-being of the
community at large. If he be guilty without the palliation
of mental infirmity, certainly the severest penal code-with
the single qualification of cases of murder in the first de-
gree - can ask nothing more than this. If, on the other
hand, he was at the time laboring under mental derange-
ment, in no other way can the extent of his responsibility
be accurately determined and the proper degree of disci-
pline adjusted. For this great question of sanity or insanity
can really be only determined by those to whose daily
and hourly care the convict is committed, and who have
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thus full opportunity of inquiring into his antecedent as
well as his present condition. "Thus," to adopt the lan-
guage of an intelligent commentator, "except as regards
the curative course to be adopted, on our view of the case,
the subtle line of distinction which there have been so
many abortive attempts to draw, between criminal and
non-criminal lunatics, is of no practical importance, and the
unavailing search, unless as a matter of metaphysical spec-
ulation, may be abandoned as unnecessary. In either case,
the person concerned, whether called a lunatic, or an ordi-
nary criminal, should be so placed as to put it out of -his
power to inflict further injury, and to afford the most like-
ly means for his cure." And thus, also, not only will the
sanction of human life and property be protected from
the recurrence of those monstrous acquittals, by which, un-
der the plea of insanity, the most dangerous criminals are
suffered to run at large, but the interests of humanity will
be subserved by a proper discipline, as well as a just classi-
fication, of those whose accountability is diminished or de-
stroyed.36
By thus abolishing, in effect, the defense of insanity, a funda-
mental change in the philosophy of criminal law would be effected.
It is evident that society is not yet ready for such drastic reform.3 7
A prerequisite, it seems, will be a successfully established rehabili-
3 6 WHARToN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 764-769. In conjunction with the
citation of nineteenth century commentators, a remark by Val Satterfield,
Chairman, Psychiatry Section, American Academy of Forensic Sciences, is in-
structive. He calls attention to the tendency of modem students of forensic
psychiatry to gloss over the writings of nineteenth century observers and
in so doing to lose a number of potent insights (personal communication).
3 7 Judge Parker, in a majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, considers the state's argument that modern humane treatment of
convicts "practically removes them from the realm of punishment and places
them in a position but little different from those other unfortunate members
of society which the state is obliged to care for and restrain of their liberty;
not because they have committed wrong, but because of their menace to so-
ciety and themselves without fault of their own, the insane . . .. The
argument seems, to be, in its last analysis, that because of modem humane
methods in caring for and treating those convicted of crime, there is no
longer any reason for taking into consideration the element of will on the
part of those who commit prohibited acts, when their guilt is being de-
termined for the purpose of putting them in the criminal class for restraint
and treatment Learned counsel's premise suggests a noble conception, and
may give promise of a condition of things towards which the humanitarian
spirit of the age is tending; yet the stern and awful fact still remains, and is
patent to all men, that the status and condition, in the eyes of the world and
under the law, of one convicted of crime is vastly different from that of one
simply adjudged insane. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the element
of punishment is still in our criminal laws." State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106,
110 Pac. 1020, 1025 (1910). See also Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder
in Crime: A Survey, 32 CoL. L. Rsv. 933, 952-53 (1932); Rood, Statutory
Abolition of the Defense of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 9 McE. L. REv. 126
(1910).
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tation program that has vigor if the lurking constitutional objec-
tions are to be overcome.
In working through the functional interrelations of these three
facets of criminal justice, we gain a dearer realization of the dis-
tinct problems that arise in the criminal law as opposed to the
psychiatric problems found in civil litigation. Let us now move
into the arena of the courtroom and look at witnesses and parties
that may be mentally ill.
IV. THE MENTALLY ILL oN =a WrNwsS STAND AND As
PARTIES iN PRSONAL INJURY LrIIGATION
The ramifications of this subject have not yet been explored
in any great detail. A broad framework for investigation, however,
has been constructed by Wigmore and Smith. Wigmore lists "mental
derangement" as one of the generic human traits to be considered
in analyzing testimonial evidence and cites a copious literature,
much of which is outdated however.38 We need a modern series
of systematic psychological studies of witnesses, it seems to me, be-
fore we can crystallize functional generalizations that amount to
more than "courtroom hunches," valuable as these may be.39
Smith has been developing a series of comprehensive investi-
gations involving problems of mental illness as they arise in per-
sonal injury litigation4 0 Through the active cooperation of many
scientists in diverse fields, he has been extremely successful in
weaving together a functional approach to the so-called "traumatic
neuroses and psychoses." Since the law-science integration in this
field is undergoing rapid development currently, it is rather pre-
mature at this juncture to attempt detailed report on its progress.
Suffice to say, we are presently hammering out the fundamentals
in the courtroom (through medicolegal consultation work), in the
classroom (through lectures, demonstrations, and discussions in
forensic neurology and psychiatry), in special lectures (to claims
men and plaintiff's attorneys in particular), and in medicolegal re-
search projects (emphasizing intensive student participation).
38 THE ScIzcE oF JuDIcIaL. PRoor 345 (3d ed. 1937).
39BuRTI, II.GA PSYCHoLOGy (1931) manages only a single paragraph on
this topic (p. 115). Recently, however, more study has been given this fertile
area. See, for example, Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal
Witness, 59 YA= L. J. 1324 (1950), and Orenstein, Examination of the Com-
plaining Witness in a Criminal Court, 107 AM. J. PsvcmAT. 684 (1951).
4
o Cross-Examination of Neuropsychiatric Testimony in Personal Injury
Cases, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 1 (1950); Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's
Own Life: Legal Recognition and Protection, 98 U. op PA. L. RE. 781 (1950);
Smith and Cobb, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944), 19 AN. INT. M D. 873 (1943);
Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943), 21
ANNx. INT. MED. 367 (1944).
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V. CONCLUSION
From our survey of several problem areas in the legal relations
of the mentally ill, it is possible to suggest certain guides for the
future development of forensic psychiatry and psychology.
1. Broadly conceived notions of law-science integration are re-
quired.41 No longer can the scientist shrug his shoulders and say
that these medicolegal problems do not concern him. Lawyers and
judges cannot continue to dodge their responsibility to act in the
light of the best psychological information extant.
2. Communication barriers must be bridged between scientific
specialists and lawyers. Until men in these various disciplines make
deliberate effort to become conversant with the various viewpoints
that have been developed in the "other man's province," future
progress is problematical. The limited number of men who are
today trained in both science and the law cannot "go it alone."
They require active cooperation from all sides.
3. Public apathy toward problems of the mentally ill has been
reflected in the archaic condition of statutory law in many states.
For the most part, provision for periodic revision to keep pace with
current situations is non-existent. Lawyers have a special duty in
this field42 and many are showing increased interest in the prob-
lems involved.43
4. In this review, I have examined the viewpoints of several
authorities who have made significant contributions toward our un-
derstanding of basic problems in limited areas of psychological law.
It is not represented that this amounts to a thorough survey or an
extensive analysis. The aim has been merely to throw a spotlight
on several of the leading guideposts to the future.
5. Finally, we must recognize the tentative nature of our
present insights and give heed to the counsel of a great legal schol-
ar, Bishop:
This subject of insanity is practically difficult. Men of
sane mind know themselves but imperfectly, and they com-
prehend others less than themselves; nor is there language
to convey, in exact form even the little knowledge we
possess of the sane mind. When, therefore, we undertake
41 "It is not easy to over-estimate or to exaggerate the importance of the
subject; - the great difficulties that surround it,-its bearing upon personal
liberty and life,- the rights of property and the safety of society,- all
enhance the necessity of approaching insanity with a true appreciation of
the strength of the ramparts behind which it is intrenched" ELwEI, A MsIco-
LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRAcTIcE, MEDICAL EVIDENCE, AND INsANITY 371-72 (4th
ed. 1881).
42 Melaney, Commitment of the Mentaly Ill: Treatment or Travesty?, 12
U. OF Pr. L. REv. 52 (1950).
43 The American Bar Association has had a Special Committee on Rights
of the Mentally Ill for ten years. 68 A.BA. REP. 183 (1943).
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to investigate the phenomena of insanity, to discuss them,
and to deduce from the principles of law the legal rules to
govern them, we are embarrassed with difficulties which
should make us cautious, and restrain us from any ex-
tensive laying down of doctrines for unseen future cases.
So that caution should guide judges, counsel, and juries in
their investigations of insanity. They may well restrict
their theories to the particular facts in issue, and though
they accept the aid of experts it should not be overlooked
that they are liable to err.... We think ourselves wiser
upon this subject than were our fathers; undoubtedly we
are but there is wisdom yet to be acquired.44
44 1 BisHOP, Tam CawAL LAw 240 (8th ed. 1892).
